The rule:
tools/list is discovery. At least one real tools/call through MCP Boundary is runtime proof.
Current Evidence Summary
| Area | Status | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Local Email Demo | verified local demo | Simulated read/draft/send-block flow. No provider or real email. |
| Gmail-like local stdio server | scoped runtime proof | Downstream-managed OAuth path proved read metadata, controlled draft, controlled send, and selected controlled label/archive/trash actions for configured candidates. |
| Taylor Google Workspace candidate | scoped candidate proof | Downstream-managed stdio OAuth path proved selected Gmail read/draft/send/trash-label actions. Not a full Workspace claim. |
| Official Gmail MCP endpoint | provider blocked | OAuth and tools/list worked, but real tool execution was blocked by provider permission. |
| Database examples | scoped smoke | Useful for read/write rule examples and state binding with synthetic data. |
| GitHub test repo | scoped smoke | Useful for selected repo/test-account behavior. Not full GitHub support. |
| Microsoft 365 / Outlook | standalone provider smoke | Softeria 0.129.1 authenticated with a dedicated personal Microsoft test mailbox and completed one get-mailbox-settings call outside MCP Boundary. Full MCP Boundary runtime and work/school tenants remain unverified. |
Release Artifact Smokes
The current packaged artifacts were not only built. They were unpacked and smoke tested from the release packages.
| Artifact | Status | What was tested |
|---|---|---|
| Windows ZIP | artifact smoke passed for dashboard/demo/doctor/serve baseline | --version, quickstart email --no-dashboard, connected dashboard quickstart, doctor, serve email-demo, draft allowed, send blocked, no generic secret-marker output. |
| Linux tarball | artifact smoke passed in a Linux environment for dashboard/demo/doctor/serve baseline plus bounded credential CLI no-leak path | Same baseline release-smoke path as Windows, executed from the Linux tarball; bounded credential CLI credential_store_unavailable / no-leak path with fake values; no fake credential values leaked to smoke files/logs. |
This is still artifact-level smoke evidence. It proves the packaged binaries start and the included local email demo works. It is not a claim that every Linux distribution, package manager, shell, or MCP client has been tested.
Linux package smoke also exercises a bounded credential CLI unavailable/no-leak path with fake values and verifies no fake credential values are leaked.
The current Linux credential smoke exercises:
credentials login-urlcredentials logincredentials store-secretdoctorwith a credential profile, requiring boundedcredential_profileandcredential_storestatuses- fake-value leak checks for
access-secret,refresh-secret-value,client-secret-value,Bearer test-token, andpassword=hunter2
It proves the packaged CLI handles the bounded credential_store_unavailable path and no-leak checks. It does not prove a successful desktop Secret Service/keyring storage path, real-provider OAuth readiness, or production credential security.
On Linux, credential-store/login depends on an OS keyring backend. Minimal or headless environments may return the bounded status credential_store_unavailable.
Safe Claims
Good:
MCP Boundary can run a configured local MCP server through a checked tool-call path.
Good:
A configured downstream-managed local Gmail-like MCP server has scoped read, draft, send, and selected label/archive/trash evidence.
Bad:
MCP Boundary supports Gmail.
Bad:
MCP Boundary makes email safe.
Not Claimed
MCP Boundary does not claim:
- production security
- data-loss-prevention guarantees
- prompt-injection protection
- universal provider support
- safe-by-default sending or deletion
- full Google Workspace / Gmail / Outlook / GitHub / database support
- hosted multi-tenant gateway behavior
A longer evidence document ships inside the downloaded ZIP/tarball at docs/mcpboundary/publish/guides/tested-servers-and-limits.md.