MCP Boundary

Tested Servers And Limits

MCP Boundary uses scoped evidence. A successful test of one tool does not become a broad provider-support claim.

The rule:

tools/list is discovery.
At least one real tools/call through MCP Boundary is runtime proof.

Current Evidence Summary

AreaStatusWhat it means
Local Email Demoverified local demoSimulated read/draft/send-block flow. No provider or real email.
Gmail-like local stdio serverscoped runtime proofDownstream-managed OAuth path proved read metadata, controlled draft, controlled send, and selected controlled label/archive/trash actions for configured candidates.
Taylor Google Workspace candidatescoped candidate proofDownstream-managed stdio OAuth path proved selected Gmail read/draft/send/trash-label actions. Not a full Workspace claim.
Official Gmail MCP endpointprovider blockedOAuth and tools/list worked, but real tool execution was blocked by provider permission.
Database examplesscoped smokeUseful for read/write rule examples and state binding with synthetic data.
GitHub test reposcoped smokeUseful for selected repo/test-account behavior. Not full GitHub support.
Microsoft 365 / Outlookstandalone provider smokeSofteria 0.129.1 authenticated with a dedicated personal Microsoft test mailbox and completed one get-mailbox-settings call outside MCP Boundary. Full MCP Boundary runtime and work/school tenants remain unverified.

Release Artifact Smokes

The current packaged artifacts were not only built. They were unpacked and smoke tested from the release packages.

ArtifactStatusWhat was tested
Windows ZIPartifact smoke passed for dashboard/demo/doctor/serve baseline--version, quickstart email --no-dashboard, connected dashboard quickstart, doctor, serve email-demo, draft allowed, send blocked, no generic secret-marker output.
Linux tarballartifact smoke passed in a Linux environment for dashboard/demo/doctor/serve baseline plus bounded credential CLI no-leak pathSame baseline release-smoke path as Windows, executed from the Linux tarball; bounded credential CLI credential_store_unavailable / no-leak path with fake values; no fake credential values leaked to smoke files/logs.

This is still artifact-level smoke evidence. It proves the packaged binaries start and the included local email demo works. It is not a claim that every Linux distribution, package manager, shell, or MCP client has been tested.

Linux package smoke also exercises a bounded credential CLI unavailable/no-leak path with fake values and verifies no fake credential values are leaked.

The current Linux credential smoke exercises:

  • credentials login-url
  • credentials login
  • credentials store-secret
  • doctor with a credential profile, requiring bounded credential_profile and credential_store statuses
  • fake-value leak checks for access-secret, refresh-secret-value, client-secret-value, Bearer test-token, and password=hunter2

It proves the packaged CLI handles the bounded credential_store_unavailable path and no-leak checks. It does not prove a successful desktop Secret Service/keyring storage path, real-provider OAuth readiness, or production credential security.

On Linux, credential-store/login depends on an OS keyring backend. Minimal or headless environments may return the bounded status credential_store_unavailable.

Safe Claims

Good:

MCP Boundary can run a configured local MCP server through a checked tool-call path.

Good:

A configured downstream-managed local Gmail-like MCP server has scoped read,
draft, send, and selected label/archive/trash evidence.

Bad:

MCP Boundary supports Gmail.

Bad:

MCP Boundary makes email safe.

Not Claimed

MCP Boundary does not claim:

  • production security
  • data-loss-prevention guarantees
  • prompt-injection protection
  • universal provider support
  • safe-by-default sending or deletion
  • full Google Workspace / Gmail / Outlook / GitHub / database support
  • hosted multi-tenant gateway behavior

A longer evidence document ships inside the downloaded ZIP/tarball at docs/mcpboundary/publish/guides/tested-servers-and-limits.md.